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OF U.S.-PRC NORMALIZATION* 
Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang** 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Normalization with the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
ranked high on the United States' foreign policy objective list ever 
since President Nixon's 1972 visit to the PRC, and President Ford's 
1975 visit. The only questions were: when, how, and on what terms? 
Peking made its three preconditions for normalization with the United 
States well known: withdrawal of recognition of the Republic of 
China, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and abrogation of the 
Defense Treaty with Taiwan. During the Nixon and Ford Adminis-
trations, however, normalization of relations with the PRC was 
blocked by the U.S. unwillingness to accept three demands from Pe-
king without a firm pledge in return that the PRC would refrain from 
using military force to unite Taiwan with mainland China. 1 Finally, 
on December 15, 1978, President Carter dramatically announced the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Commentators have analyzed this issue from many different an-
gles. Some have used strategic considerations to explain normaliza-
tion. Others rely on domestic factors, such as the 1972 Watergate 
scandal, U.S. congressional opposition, the deaths of Mao Tse-tung 
and Chou En-lai, the fall of the Gang of Four, and the rise of Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing. Still others ascribe to economic factors (such as U.S. 
trade deficits, the PRC's Four Modernizations program, and China's 
market potential) as the impetus for normalization. None, however, 
examines the terms of the normalization decision from Peking's nego-
tiating style perspective. This study attempts to do this. 
This article first reviews the U.S. negotiating stance. The discus-
sion then turns to an analysis of the means by which Peking achieved 
• A paper prepared for presentation to the 26th Annual Convention of International 
Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 5-9, 1985. An earlier version of this paper 
appeared in American Studies, XIV, No. 4 (December 1984), pp. 55-80. Reprinted here 
with permission. 
•• Associate Research Fellow, Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica; Asso-
ciate Professor, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. 
1. George Bush, "Our Deal with Peking: All Cost, No Benefit," Washington Post, 24 
December 1978, pp. D3-4. 
(1) 
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its goals in the normalization process-namely, through its negotia-
tion tactics. 
2. THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS 
Since 1972, the major question regarding Peking-Washington 
normalization was who should make what kind of concession on the 
Taiwan issue. The U.S. position on the Taiwan issue evolved in sev-
eral changes. After his visit to the PRC in 1972, President Nixon pri-
vately reassured the Republic of China that the U.S. intended to 
"honor its defense treaty commitments" to Taiwan. 2 President Nixon 
also stated publicly that "our action in seeking a new relationship with 
the PRC will not be at the expense of our old friends." 3 During a news 
conference on May 6, 1975, President Ford also reaffirmed U.S. com-
mitments to the Republic of China.4 
The Nixon Administration had a secret negotiating plan, how-
ever, to accept Peking's three conditions for normalization if there was 
a firm commitment from Peking to settle the Taiwan question peace-
fully. According to Eugene K. Lawson, a former officer on the Re-
public . of China desk at the State Department, the Nixon 
Administration had set the following conditions for normalization: 
The defense treaty was, of course, the bottom line, and 
of Peking's three demands ... that is the one we should have 
worked on. And, in fact, the Nixon Administration did have 
a package of minimum conditions in its mind to implement. 
The most important element in the Nixon plan included 
the ways and means to find a plausible substitute for the 
treaty. First, the United States would cite only those Peo-
ple's Republic statements that spoke of resolving the situa-
tion peacefully and ignore the more belligerent ones. 
Second, the president would issue with the Congress a state-
ment after normalization with Peking was achieved that 
force by anyone in the Taiwan Straits would cause the 
United States to consider whatever military actions appeared 
necessary to preserve peace. 
Moreover, we would continue to ensure that the inter-
2. Jerome Alan Cohen, "Recognizing China," Foreign Affairs, 50, no. 1 (October 
1971), p. 31. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Excerpt from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 12, 1975, in 
U.S. Information Agency, Major Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials January-
June 1975, August 18, 1975, p. 20. 
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national waters existing between the mainland and Taiwan 
would be open to all countries, and, finally, we would con-
tinue to sell defensive equipment to Taiwan. Our assump-
tion was that we were in the driver's seat and Peking had its 
conditions for normalization, we had ours. As for the future 
of Taiwan, we would follow the Shanghai Communique by 
keeping the door open on its ultimate status, in the same way 
Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and others have done. 5 
3 
On December 15, 1978, President Carter dramatically announced 
establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The Carter 
Administration accepted Peking's three demands without a firm com-
mitment from Peking not to use military force to attack Taiwan. In-
stead, the U.S. declared unilaterally that "the United States continues 
to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and 
expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese 
themselves." 
The United States considered that Peking had made three conces-
sions to Washington. First, the U.S. would terminate the Mutual De-
fense Treaty in accordance with its terms rather than abrogating it as 
the PRC previously demanded. Second, the PRC did not contradict 
the U.S. statement that the U.S. continues to have an interest in and 
expects the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. And third, the 
U.S. would continue to make sales of "selected defensive weaponry" to 
Taiwan on a "restricted basis" in the postnormalization period after 
the Defense Treaty expired at the end of December 1979. The PRC 
stated, however, that Peking "absolutely could not agree" to such 
arms sales; nonetheless the PRC leaders decided to go ahead with 
normalization. 
George Bush, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and former U.S. Representative to the PRC, commented on the terms 
of normalization: 
For several years, Peking had insisted on three preconditions 
before there could be "normalization". . . . The United 
States had consistently balked at those terms, insisting that it 
would not formally recognize Peking until there was a firm, 
explicit commitment to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully. 
And there the negotiations were stuck. . . . 
The terms that the Carter Administration has accepted 
and even trumpeted, are the same terms that have been avail-
5. Eugene K. Lawson, "Taiwan, We Forgot Who Held the Trump Cards," Washing-
ton Post, 24 December 1978, p. A15. 
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able for the past seven years. But they were always refused 
before because we knew-just as the Chinese knew-that in 
the absence of sufficient guarantees, they were but a figleaf 
for an abject American retreat. 6 
The American conditions, as stated by George Bush and Eugene 
Lawson, could be viewed as the initial U.S. bargaining stand. The 
bottom line, then, was that Washington would accept Peking's three 
demands if Peking would in return agree to settle the Taiwan question 
peacefully. 
Peking had repeatedly stressed that the PRC would never make a 
pledge on the settlement of the Taiwan question since mid-1950s. The 
U.S. insistence on a firm commitment from Peking on the Taiwan is-
sue had historical background. During the 1955-56 Ambassadorial 
talks, some forty meetings were held to discuss the issue of renuncia-
tion of force on Taiwan. Washington and Peking exchanged seven 
proposals and counterproposals, but found no common ground on this 
issue. 7 The PRC had also declared in 1977 that Peking would never 
permit arms sales to Taiwan after normalization of relations with the 
United States.8 How the U.S. decision makers interpreted Peking's 
declarations on these so-called "non-negotiable conditions" was a very 
important factor in determining the U.S. bids or counterbids during 
the bargaining process. 
It was disclosed that the Carter Administration during the formal 
negotiation period never asked Peking for a pledge not to use force to 
regain Taiwan. President Carter revealed at a press conference that a 
commitment from the PRC to refrain from the use of force against 
Taiwan was not "possible to achieve."9 Accordingly, Carter did not 
even bother to ask for a pledge from Peking. Why did the Carter Ad-
ministration think it was not possible to get a pledge from the PRC? 
What strategy or tactics did Peking use to convince Washington to 
accept its terms for normalization? The following sections analyze 
these issues. 
6. Bush, "Our Deal with Peking," supra note 1, pp. D3-4. 
7. For further information of the dialogue on the renunciation of force to regain Tai-
wan, see Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book, 1968), pp. 91-115 and appendix, pp. 414-17. 
8. Louis Boccardi, "Deng: Vance Trip Was Setback in U.S.-China Ties," Washington 
Post, 7 September 1977. 
9. Don Oberdorfer, "Carter Says He Tried in Vain for Peking Promise on Taiwan," 
Washington Post, 1 January 1979, p. A2. 
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3. PEKING'S NEGOTIATING STYLE 
Many scholars have attempted to analyze Peking's bargaining 
techniques. Before the opening of the China door in 1971, the United 
States underwent a series of unhappy experiences in negotiating with 
the PRC at Panmunjom and in the Geneva and Warsaw ambassado-
rial talks. In his book, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, the 
late Ambassador Kenneth T. Young offered excellent analyses of Pe-
king's negotiating styles under hostile adversary conditions. 10 Ambas-
sador U. Alexis Johnson, in his revealing memoirs, The Right Hand of 
Power, also provides us with the details of his negotiating experiences 
with the PRC from 1954 to 1958. 11 Ambassador Johnson conducted 
numerous talks with Peking's representative Wang Ping-nan during 
the period of 1955-1958. These talks produced one agreement, the 
Agreement on Exchange of Civilians, which was the only formal 
agreement reached between Peking and Washington before the 1972 
Shanghai Communique. 
Ambassador Johnson notes that the PRC leaders were "proud, 
stubborn, unpredictable, sometimes harsh opponents. They ignored 
written commitments when it suited them, as they did with the Agreed 
Announcement on prisoners." 12 Ambassador Young pointed out that 
the Western negotiating process tends to encourage "fair dealing, ac-
curate statements, courteous behavior, and conciliatory practices." 
Young believed that Peking's style is quite the reverse of the Western 
way.B The main points of Young's analyses of Peking's adversary 
style can be summarized as follows: 
e Peking did not seem to consider cooperative negotiations 
and concessions as valid bargaining devices to find a 
common ground for agreement, or for seeking a compro-
mise of principles in order to conclude a basic 
agreement. 
e Peking was less inclined to accept immediate advantages 
at the potential cost of future disadvantages, and more 
inclined to make present sacrifices in the hope of future 
gains, than are most countries. 
e Peking was good at manipulating the agenda in order to 
place their opposites in an unfavorable trading position. 
10. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, supra note 7. 
ll. U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice 
Hall, 1984). 
12. Ibid., p. 262. 
13. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, supra note 7, p. 73. 
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It was designed to get two concessions for the price of 
one agreement. 
e If Peking accepts restraint, it does so from political and 
tactical considerations alone and not from any sense of 
legal obligation under internationallaw. 14 
The American perception toward Peking's negotiating style has 
undergone significant change since the opening of the China door. 
The U.S. no longer views the PRC as a hostile nation. In the 1950s, 
the characteristic features of adversary negotiations between Washing-
ton and Peking were mistrust, suspicion, the utter lack of any good 
faith, and manipulation. In the 1970s, Moscow has replaced Peking as 
Washington's adversary negotiator. Henry Kissinger notes that the 
top leaders of the PRC were tough, shrewd bargainers, and very pa-
tient. 15 Kissinger's characterization of Peking's style of diplomacy can 
be summarized as follows: 
e Peking uses friendship as a halter in advance of negotia-
tion; by admitting the interlocutor to at least the appear-
ance of personal intimacy, a subtle restraint is placed on 
the claims he can put forward. 
e Peking can use self-criticism as a tool. 
e Peking proved meticulously reliable. The PRC leaders 
never stooped to petty maneuvers; they did not haggle; 
they reached their bottom line quickly, explained it rea-
sonably, and defended it tenaciously. They stuck to the 
meaning as well as the spirit of their undertakings. 16 
Professor Lucian Pye published a book in 1982 Chinese Commer-
cial Negotiating Style. This book analyzes Peking's ways of negotiat-
ing commercial contracts. It is the first published book on the 
experiences of American and Japanese businessmen-both their suc-
cesses and their difficulties in seeking agreements with the officials of 
the PRC. Professor Pye describes how officials of the PRC maneuver 
for position at the beginning of negotiations, what procedures they 
tend to follow, their ploys and strategies, their expectations on con-
cluding agreements, and how one can avoid probable pitfalls. The 
analysis is based upon extensive information interviews and conversa-
tions conducted by Professor Pye with Americans and Japanese en-
gaged in trade with the PRC. This book is also valuable in providing 
14. Ibid., pp. 373-79. 
15. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 188. 
16. Henry Kissingr, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 
p. 1056. 
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guidance for government-to-government negotiations. Professor Pye 
singles out some negotiating principles as general guidelines to deal 
with the officials in the PRC, which he terms as follows: 
e Exercise the rule of patience. 
e Maintain the principle of restrained steadfastness. 
e A void the trap of indebtedness. 
e Prevent exaggerated expectations. 
e Resist efforts at shaming. 
e Taking general principles seriously. 
e Master the record. 
e Employ damage limitation measures. 
e Know Chinese cultural differences, but be yourself. 17 
Professor Pye thinks these generalizations also have direct rele-
vance for government-to-government negotiations. Pye suggests that 
the rule of patience is probably more applicable to governmental nego-
tiations; the PRC will be alert to exploit any natural American inclina-
tion to impatience. 18 
Richard Solomon, a China expert involved in negotiations with 
Peking from 1971 to 1976 as a member of the U.S. National Security 
Council, wrote a paper analyzing Peking's bargaining behavior in 
1983. This paper is based on the experience of U.S. officials who nego-
tiated normalization with Peking in the 1970s. It is a confidential 
study written for the U.S. National Intelligence Council by the Rand 
corporation. Its main points were revealed by the Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review in June 1984 as follows: 
e Peking always attempts to cultivate foreign officials sym-
pathetic to its cause, manipulating personal relationships 
(guanxi) and feelings of friendship, obligation or guilt in 
an interplay between superior and dependent. 
e Peking always seeks to establish her own ground rules 
by pressing its foreign counterparts to agree to certain 
general "principles," which are later constantly invoked. 
e Peking's negotiating positions are highly sensitive to the 
play of PRC's own political factionalism: a strong 
leader can promote a policy which a collective leader-
ship would be unable to support, or a negotiating posi-
tion may be withdrawn or hardened as a result of 
factional conflict. 
17. Lucian Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style (Cambridge, Mass.: Oe1ges-
ch1ager, Gunn & Hain, 1982), pp. 92-97. 
18. Ibid., p. 97. 
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e Peking prefers to negotiate on its own territory, for being 
at home aids internal communications, decision-making 
and its orchestration of the ambience of negotiations 
from banquet toasts to the manipulation of the press. 
e Peking often uses a trusted intermediary to convey its 
prenegotiating position to a foreign government in a de-
niable or face-saving manner in order to "load" the 
agenda of its foreign counterpart. 
e Another pressure tactic is that of: "you need us; we 
don't need you!" 
e Peking also plays adversaries against each other. 
e A major negotiating tactic is to bring time pressures to 
play against an interlocutor, most often by dragging out 
the bargaining process ("We Chinese are a patient peo-
ple"). The end game occurs once the PRC officials con-
clude that they have fully assessed an interlocutor's 
flexibility. They can move swiftly to conclude an agree-
ment, sometimes showing extreme flexibility themselves. 
e Reaching agreement with Peking does not mean the end 
of negotiations. Peking frequently re-opens issues the 
foreigner thought to be resolved. 19 
Solomon suggests that the best way to negotiate with Peking is to 
"know your own bottom line. Incremental compromises ... [and] 
repeated shifts in position will suggest to a [PRC] negotiator that his 
adversary's final position has not yet been reached."20 
4. ACCEPTANCE OF PEKING'S TERMS 
It is within the context of Peking's negotiating style and bargain-
ing techniques that we proceed to explain why the U.S. normalized 
relations with the PRC in late 1978 mainly on Peking's terms. 
Ambassador Johnson points out in his memoirs that he has al-
ways favored full diplomatic relations between Washington and Pe-
king, but never understood why it had to be done on terms dictated by 
Peking. Johnson thinks that the concessions toward normalization 
came almost entirely from the United States. "Peking had obtained 
full recognition from the Carter Administration without agreement to 
renounce force against Taiwan, and extracting from the U.S. the hu-
miliation of descending to the transparent subterfuge of using a 'pri-
19. Derek Davies, "How Britain fell for the Peking game-plan," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, June 21, 1984, pp. 44-45. 
20. Ibid., p. 45. 
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vate foundation' to act as a channel for government-to-government 
relations with Taiwan.'m In a report of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Congress criticized the Carter Administration on several 
accounts for not getting a better deal on the Taiwan issue: 
First, the United States yielded on all three of the PRC's 
major conditions for normalization. . . . Even when the PRC 
dropped a newer fourth condition banning U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan, the U.S. agreed to a one-year moratorium on new 
sales commitments. 
Second, the U.S. did not obtain a pledge from the PRC 
that it would not take military action against Taiwan. 
Third, the language of the December 15, 1978 commu-
nique goes slightly beyond that of the 1972 Shanghai Com-
munique in recognizing China's claim to sovereignty over 
Taiwan. It also goes further than similar statements made 
by some other countries. In the Shanghai Communique the 
U.S. "acknowledges" and agrees not to challenge the posi-
tion of Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits that Tai-
wan is part of China. 
In the December 15 Communique, the U.S. "acknowl-
edges" as the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. 
The extent of this change is more marked in the Chinese 
translations of the two communiques, but the Committee 
was assured by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher that the U.S. adheres to only the English translation.22 
In February 1979, Dr. Ray Cline testified in a Congressional 
hearing and revealed his conversation with Dr. Henry Kissinger on 
the normalization terms as follows: 
I happened to encounter Dr. Kissinger this morning .... 
Only a few hours ago, I asked Dr. Kissinger: "Did you and 
President Nixon ever give any assurance of normalization on 
the terms that Peking dictated and President Carter ac-
cepted?" And he said, "Absolutely not. I am on the record 
repeatedly on this point.'' It is unfair to suggest the Carter 
decision was the same one as the Shanghai Communique de-
cision, which was· to normalize with Peking but on terms 
21. Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, supra note 11, p. 264. 
22. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan Enabling Act, 
96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, Report No. 96-7, p. 9. 
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where we preserved our relations with Taiwan. 23 
In his memoirs, Years of Upheaval, Kissinger discloses his con-
versation with Mao on November 12, 1973 on the settlement on the 
Taiwan issue: 
Having established the basic analysis of the international 
situation in about an hour, Mao suddenly turned to the issue 
of Taiwan, and then not to state but to hint obliquely at a 
solution. He had heard that the three Baltic states still had 
embassies in the U.S., he said. I affirmed it. "And the Soviet 
Union did not ask you first to abolish those embassies before 
they established diplomatic relations with you?" That was 
not exactly accurate, since the time relations were estab-
lished the Soviet Union recognized the Baltic states. But if 
Mao was implying that relations with Taiwan were no neces-
sary obstacle ot normalization with China, I saw no reason 
to draw fine historical distinctions; so I assented to his prop-
osition. Chou [En-lai] helpfully chipped in that though 
maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S., the Baltic 
states did not have access to the United Nations. Did all this 
mean, I wondered, that China might acquiesce in a separate 
legal status for Taiwan, contenting itself with excluding Tai-
wan from the UN? ... 
What did all this mean? Was it another hint that nor-
malization could be separated from the issue of Taiwan? 
And that the rate of normalizing relations was up to us? ... I 
am inclined to believe that like Chou on the day before, Mao 
was indirectly inviting a proposal that combined the princi-
ple of a unified China with some practical accommodation to 
the status quo. 24 
Mao in 1973 showed signs of some flexibility on the settlement of 
the Taiwan question after normalization of relations between Wash-
ington and Peking. An endless debate could ensue over whether the 
U.S. in fact could have gotten a better deal on the Taiwan question in 
1978. Many experts think that the Carter Administration did not try 
hard enough to get a better deal from Peking on the Taiwan issue. 
The Carter Administration apparently thought the normalization 
agreement was good enough. 
23. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Legislation, hear-
ings, 96th Congress, 1st Session, February 7 and 8, 1979, p. 115. 
24. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 
pp. 691-92. 
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Decision-makers' perceptions are important sources in explaining 
a nation's foreign policy. Ole Holsti believes that "an individual's be-
havior is in large part shaped by the manner in which he perceives, 
diagnoses, and evaluates his physical and social environment."25 A 
nation's actions are dependent upon "its perception of the results of its 
own actions, which often depend on the estimate of the other coun-
try's future reactions."26 How the U.S. decision makers perceived Pe-
king's "non-negotiable principle" on the Taiwan issue constituted an 
important ingredient in defining Washington's bargaining position on 
normalization negotiations. 
According to P.H. Gulliver, negotiation is "one kind of problem-
solving process-one in which people attempt to reach a joint decision 
on matters of common concern in situations where they are in disa-
greement and conflict."27 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing believe 
that "bargaining is largely a process of manipulating values and per-
ceptions of them. " 28 Thomas C. Schelling also states that bargaining 
by one party "is guided mainly by his expectations of what the other 
will accept. " 29 Schelling further discusses how a convergence emerged 
from bargaining as follows: 
A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, suffi-
cient concession. Why does he concede? Because he thinks 
the other will not. "I must concede because he won't. He 
won't because he thinks I will. He thinks I will because he 
thinks I think he thinks so. 30 
J.N. Morgan has described bargaining power as the power to fool 
and bluff, or, in his words, "the ability to set the best price for yourself 
and fool the other man into thinking this was your maximum offer."31 
Various bargaining tactics and strategies have been discussed in the 
writings of Thomas Schelling, Robert Jervis, Oran Young, Glenn Sny-
25. Ole Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Robert Axelrod, 
ed., Structure of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 19. 
26. Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1976), p. 272. 
27. P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 
xiii. 
28. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977), p. 183. 
29. Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining," in Oran R. Young, ed., Bargain-
ing Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 319. 
30. Ibid. 
31. J.N. Morgan, "Bilateral Monopoly and the Competitive Output," Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 63 (August 1949), 376, note 6, quoted in Schelling, "An Essay on Bar-
gaining," supra note 29, p. 320. 
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der, Paul Diesing, William Zartman, Maureen Berman, P. H. Gul-
liver, Fred Charles Ikle, and Daniel Druckman. 32 The main point of 
bargaining tactics is how to communicate effectively and persuasively 
one's demands, offers, commitments, threats, and concessions to the 
other party. 
In connection with the normalization terms, there were three pos-
sibilities to interpret Peking's firm and non-negotiable conditions for 
normalization. First, the U.S. decision-makers could have interpreted 
Peking as bluffing. Second, Washington could have interpreted Peking 
as not yet ready to yield on the Taiwan question but would soon. 
Third, the U.S. could have believed Peking meant what it said-
namely, that the leaders of the PRC would never concede on the Tai-
wan question. The U.S. apparently adopted the third interpretation of 
Peking's messages on the Taiwan question during the normalization 
negotiating period. The normalization agreement was reached in 1978 
after Washington gave up its once "non-negotiable" prinicple of a firm 
pledge from Peking not to use force to resolve the Taiwan question. In 
January 1979, President Carter acknowledged that seeking a clear 
commitment from Peking to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully had 
been a U.S. goal, but such a pledge was not possible to achieve. 
5. CONCESSION ON TAIWAN 
Two major explanations can be offered to explain why the U.S. 
decided to accept Peking's terms for normalization. First, unlike the 
situation in the mid-1950s, the U.S. in 1978 sincerely intended to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the PRC in order to gain strategic 
leverage over the Soviet Union. During the 1955-58 ambassadorial 
talks, the United States did not have any interest in making any con-
cession on the Taiwan question. 
The idea for mutual renunciation of force between Peking and 
Washington had originated with Secretary of State Dulles, who first 
declared it at a press conference on January 18, 1955, as a significant 
move back from his "liberation" policy.33 Peking and Washington, 
32. See, for example, Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1960); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Rela-
tions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Young, Bargaining supra note 
29, Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations; supra note 28, Gulliver, Disputes and 
Negotiations supra note 27, I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical 
Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Daniel Druckman, ed., Negotiations (Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1977). 
33. Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, supra note 11, p. 253. 
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however, had different definitions of the "renunciation of force on Tai-
wan." To Peking, a renunciation of force meant an unconditional 
American withdrawal from Taiwan: whereas to Washington it meant 
an unconditional renunciation of efforts to take Taiwan by military 
means.34 Peking was not willing to accept the U.S. demand at that 
time because it did not want to limit its claim to sovereignty over Tai-
wan. To Peking, a formal endorsement of the American proposal 
would mean the acceptance of two Chinas. 35 The PRC was willing, 
however, to accept a renunciation of force agreement with no specific 
reference to the Taiwan areas. Washington, on the other hand, in-
sisted at the time that its position on Taiwan was inflexible and "non-
negotiable. "36 
In the mid-1950s, the PRC's real interest was to arrange a confer-
ence of foreign ministers "to settle through negotiations the question 
of relaxing and eliminating the tension in [the] Taiwan area.'m Secre-
tary of State Dulles countered Peking's initiative by insisting on the 
mutual renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area as a precon-
dition for further talks on the arrangement of a foreign minister's con-
ference. Peking's subsequent refusal to accept the U.S. condition 
successfully blocked further talks for a high-level conference. Wash-
ington also avoided any blame for the impasse in the talks because 
Peking was the one who refused to make accommodations on the Tai-
wan question. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. saw no significant benefits from 
making any concession on the Taiwan issue. The international envi-
ronment in the 1970s was much more complex and dynamic than that 
of the previous two decades. The U.S. was anxious to improve rela-
tions with the PRC in order to gain strategic, economic, and other 
benefits. The Taiwan question was temporarily put aside by Peking 
and Washington in order to deal with a greater and much more urgent 
issue-Soviet hegemonism. A high-level summit, long desired by the 
PRC in the mid-1950s, was finally arranged in 1972. The U.S. did not 
insist on any precondition, such as the non-use of force toward Tai-
wan, for the summit. Neither did the PRC insist on immediate settle-
ment of the Taiwan question. The establishment of diplomatic 
relations required, however, breaking the impasse on the Taiwan issue. 
After assessing the costs and benefits, the United States finally decided 
34. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, supra note 7, p. 93. 
35. Robert Sutter, China-Watch Sino-American Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1978), p. 55. 
36. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, supra noe 7, p. 105. 
37. Ibid., p. 415. 
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to concede on the Taiwan issue in order to gain other geopolitical ben-
efits in 1978.38 
The second major explanation of the U.S. willingness to compro-
mise on the Taiwan question is that the PRC had successfully per-
suaded the U.S. that Peking would never make any concession on the 
Taiwan question. Various tactics and strategies had been used by Pe-
king to convince Washington of its firm position on the Taiwan issue; 
as elaborated by the following discussion. 
(1) Official Statements of Peking's Principles 
Through various official statements, interviews, and meetings, Pe-
king had made known its position toward the Taiwan issue. 39 Peking 
repeatedly emphasized that the Taiwan issue was non-negotiable. The 
PRC's position, as stated in the Shanghai Communique, was that there 
is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China. The PRC was 
strongly opposed to "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one 
China, two governments," and "independent Taiwan" formulas. The 
PRC had also declared many times that the liberation of Taiwan is 
China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to inter-
fere; it is not possible, therefore, for Peking to make a pledge to re-
nounce the use of force against Taiwan. 
(2) Empirical Demonstrations, "Kill the Chicken 
to Warn the Monkey" 
The PRC had also proved its credibility of firmness on the Tai-
wan issue through empirical evidence. No country had been able to 
maintain diplomatic relations with both Peking and Taipei at the same 
time. In October 1971, before the admission of the PRC to the U.N., 
62 nations still recognized Taipei as the government of China. By the 
end of 1972, 23 countries had switched diplomatic recognition from 
Taipei to Peking. 
38. For detailed analysis of U.S. strategic considerations see, for example, Carter, 
Keeping Faith, supra note 15; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1983); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
1983); and Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, "The Process of Normalization of Relations between 
the U.S. and the PRC, 1969-1978: A Retrospective Evaluation of Decision-Making Models 
in U.S. Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, May 1983. 
39. Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and their associates have held at least 20 interviews 
to elaborate their views on Taiwan. For detailed sources of those interviews, see King C. 
Chen, "Peking's Attitude Toward Taiwan," in Hungcfah Chiu, ed., Normalizing Relations 
with the PRC· Problems, Analysis and Documents (Baltimore: University of Maryland Law 
School, 1978), pp. 35-36, note 4. 
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In the 1970s, Peking concluded 75 joint communiques with for-
eign countries concerning normalization of diplomatic relations.40 Six 
countries "recognized" the PRC as the "sole legal government of 
China" and also "recognized Peking's claim that Taiwan is 'an inalien-
able part of the territory of the PRC.' " While recognizing Peking as 
the sole legal government of China, 25 nations chose to use ambiguous 
wording toward Peking's claim to Taiwan such as, "take note of," 
"understand," "respect," or "acknowledge," rather than formally 
"recognize" that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC's territory. 
Forty-four states did not mention the status ofTaiwan in the joint 
communiques with which they established diplomatic relations with 
the PRC. A majority of those 44 countries were small nations in the 
Third World.41 The PRC, however, consistently insisted on including 
a "Taiwan clause" in the joint communique with important Asia-Pa-
cific countries or major U.S. allies, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Italy, 
Canada, Belgium, Iceland, Brazil, Japan, the Netherlands and the 
Philippines.42 The PRC-West Germany joint communique was the 
only exception; it did not mention that Bonn recognized Peking as the 
sole legal government of China. The main reason may have been the 
inferences that could have been drawn from the ambiguous political 
status between East and West Germany.43 
Peking also demonstrated its firmness toward the nonnegotiable 
one-China position in the fora of international organizations. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the PRC repeatedly declared that it would not join 
the U.N. if the Republic of China government was there. In August 
1971, two months before the United Nations General Assembly's vote 
on the admission issue, Peking reiterated its position: 
Should a situation of "two Chinas," "one China, one Tai-
wan," or "the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined" 
or any other similar situation occur in the United Nations, 
the Government of the PRC will absolutely have nothing to 
do with the U.N.44 
Since the expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N., the 
PRC successfully managed to replace the Republic of China in ten 
40. Lyushun Shen, "The Taiwan Issue in Peking's Foreign Relations in the 1970s: A 
Systematic Review," in Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 
1981, Volume I (Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1982), p. 83. 
41. Ibid., pp. 78, 83. 
42. Ibid., p. 79. 
43. Ibid., p. 79, note 15. 
44. Peking Review, 27 August 1971, p. 7, quoted in ibid., p. 84. 
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specialized agencies of the United Nations.45 Peking also successfully 
replaced Taipei as the sole legal representative of China in other inter-
governmental organizations. 46 
In other words, Peking consistently demonstrated to the U.S. as 
well as to other countries its credibility by standing firm on the Tai-
wan issue while formally negotiating normalization agreements or its 
admission to intergovernmental organizations. 
Peking did have room for flexibility toward its non-negotiable 
principle, however, when it considered it necessary to make an impor-
tant concession. The establishment of the liaison offices in Peking and 
Washington in 1973 was a good example. In February 1973, Kis-
singer went to Peking with no clear-cut plan to improve relations with 
the PRC but with an intention to propose some modest step, such as 
an American trade office in Mainland China. The Nixon Administra-
tion at that time remained convinced that the PRC did not want to 
open any office in Washington so long as the Republic of China's em-
bassy was there, a position which Peking had declared many times.47 
The U.S. was really surprised that Peking agreed to establish the liai-
son offices. 
Kissinger proudly notes in his White House Years that the United 
States had worked the Peking Taipei-Washington triangle for its best 
interests: 
For years the United States was the only country en-
joying political relations with Peking that did not have to 
sever its diplomatic ties with Taipei .... We enjoyed diplo-
matic ties in all but name; ... After the formation of liaison 
offices in each other's capitals in 1973 (following the Viet-
nam settlement), the two countries even had de facto embas-
sies to promote the broader economic, cultural, and people-
to-people exchanges that characterize relations between 
friendly states. The only element lacking was the willingness 
of Chinese leaders actually to set foot in Washington while a 
rival embassy was present.48 
In other words, the United States, before 1978, enjoyed strategic, 
political and economic benefits with only limited costs in its relations 
with the Republic of China. The U.S. on various occasions since 1972 
had given the ROC 50 to 60 reassurances of its commitments to their 
45. For details, see ibid., pp. 84-85, note 32. 
46. See ibid., p. 86, note 39. 
47. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, supra note 24, p. 61. 
48. Kissinger, White House Years, supra note 16, pp. 1092-1093. 
PEKING'S NEGOTIATION STYLE 17 
mutual defense treaty.49 
The Shanghai communique did not specify any timetable to make 
"progress toward the normalization of relations," nor did it mention 
the terms under which full normalization would take place. President 
Nixon was reported to have assured the PRC leaders that if he were 
elected to a second term full diplomatic relations would be estab-
lished.50 Peking later began to pressure the U.S. to move toward nor-
malization because President Nixon had promised it to establish 
diplomatic relations by the end of his second term. 
In August 1977, Secretary of State Vance went to Peking for ex-
ploratory talks on normalization with the PRC. In late July 1977, 
President Carter decided that he wanted to complete normalization 
and asked Cyrus Vance to prepare a draft of a communique to be is-
sued in Peking if the PRC responded favorably to U.S. presentation.51 
President Carter approved the draft in early August. On August 22, 
1977, one day before Vance's trip to the PRC, President Carter had a 
second thought and delayed the normalization initiation after talking 
to Vice President Walter Mondale about the Panama Canal Treaties 
issue. Carter decided that it would be unwise to move toward full 
normalization with the PRC before the final approval of the Panama 
Canal Treaties by the Congress. The strategy used during Vance's 
visit to Peking was to delay the process of normalization by proposing 
to the PRC a "maximum position": "U.S. government personnel 
would have to remain on Taiwan after normalization, under an infor-
mal arrangement, for purpose of rendering practical assistance to U.S. 
citizens in Taiwan."52 
In a personal interview, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary 
of State for the East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Carter Ad-
ministration, revealed that the Carter Administration knew that the 
PRC would not agree to switch embassy and liaison offices between 
Taipei and Peking, but the Carter Administration needed time. Presi-
dent Carter needed time to resolve the Panama Canal Treaties. Hoi-
brooke also said that there was never any question in his mind that the 
U.S. would fall backY Teng Hsiao-p'ing rejected Vance's suggestion 
and stated publicly that Vance's visit was a step back from normaliza-
49. Hungdah Chiu, "Normalization and Some Practical and Legal Problems Concern-
ing Taiwan," in Chiu, ed., Normalizing Relations with the PRC, supra note 39, p. 53. 
50. New York Times, 11 April 1977. 
51. Vance, Hard Choices, supra note38, p. 79. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Personal Interview with Richard Holbrooke, June 4, 1982 in Washington, D.C. 
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tion.54 Vance was annoyed by the uncharacteristic airing of Peking's 
displeasure in the press. 55 The PRC leaders demonstrated considera-
ble skill in manipulating the press as a means to bring pressure to their 
counterpart. Another pressure tactics used by the PRC during the 
normalization negotiating process was to constantly charge that the 
U.S. is guilty of not living to its commitments, or that one official is 
going back on the words of its predecessors. Peking did just that dur-
ing Vance's visit to the PRC in August 1977: 
I briefly outlined out position again, stressing that I offered it 
as a starting point for discussion. Deng, an embodiment of 
Chinese courtesy, calmly termed by comments a retreat from 
the Shanghai communique. He read me portions of a memo-
randum of a conversation in which Henry Kissinger had al-
legedly agreed that the U.S. owed a debt to China and that 
normalization would be in conformity with the Chinese con-
ditions. He referred to a discussion with President Ford in 
December 1975, in which the President had stated he would 
be in a better position to normalize relations in accordance 
with the so-called Japanese formula after the 1976 elections. 
Deng omitted to note, though, that Ford had added a quali-
fying "if'-if the Taiwan issue was worked out. Deng char-
acterized my proposal to Huang Hua as a retreat from the 
previous state of affairs. 
Deng said that the most China could accept was the 
"Japanese formula." He described what I had proposed as 
an embassy that would not have a sign or flag at its door. 56 
Besides manifesting its position through official statements and 
empirical practices, the PRC also used other tactics to increase its bar-
gaining position vis-a-vis the U.S. on the Taiwan issue. These are re-
viewed below. 
(3) Bolstering Peking's Stakes on the Taiwan Issue 
Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing have discussed the importance of 
the decision-maker's perception of the comparative stakes of itself and 
its opponent as follows: 
When a state yields on any issue, it is more likely to be be-
cause it believes its adversary's interests to be stronger than 
54. Stanley Karnow, "East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation," Foreign Affairs, 
57, No. 3 (1978), p. 598. 
55. Vance, Hard Choices, supra note 38, p. 83. 
56. Ibid., p. 82. 
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its own . . than because its independent valuation of the 
stake is low. That is, a state's resolve in a particular case is a 
function of how it perceives the comparative interests of it-
self and its opponent. ... Thus, when a state yields in a 
conflict where its own values at stake are of intermediate im-
portance, it may also yield on issues of greater importance if 
it thinks the adversary's stake is greater still; and conversely, 
it may be firm on lesser issues when it thinks the balance of 
interests favors itself. 57 
19 
For Washington, normalization challenged the "integrity of de-
fense commitments and the welfare of a long-time ally," for Peking, 
the issue of "sovereignty" was at stake. 58 Both Washington and Pe-
king's stakes on the Taiwan issue were high. But comparatively speak-
ing, nothing is more important than a nation's sovereignty. Peking 
repeatedly declared that the Taiwan issue is an issue of sovereignty. 59 
Washington finally decided to concede on the Taiwan question be-
cause Peking's stake was higher than its own. 
(4) Reducing Washington's Stakes on the Taiwan Question 
Washington's stake in breaking diplomatic relations and termi-
nating the defense treaty with Taiwan was considered a function of its 
payoffs-its costs versus its benefits-from normalization with Peking. 
Peking had tried to convince Washington that normalization on Pe-
king's terms would increase Washington's strategic and economic ben-
efits and eventually would reduce Washington's risk of getting 
involved in another civil war in Asia. Foreign Minister Huang Hua 
allegedly stated in a speech on July 20, 1977: 
When the Chinese people deem the time to be ripe to 
liberate Taiwan by force, would the American people really 
have the resolve to live or perish with the Chiang dynasty, 
and share the fate of the island of Taiwan? Go read Ameri-
can history, we have not seen an instance in which the 
57. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, supra note 32, p. 186. 
58. Richard H. Solomon, "Thinking Through the China Problem," Foreign Affairs, 56, 
No. 2 (January 1978), p. 325. 
59. For example, Hua Kuo-feng reiterated China's position on Taiwan in August 1977 
as follows: "Taiwan Province is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate 
Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's internal affairs, which brooks no foreign inter-
ference whatsoever." Quoted from the poliical report by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, to the 11th National Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of China, August 12, 1977, in Solomon, "Thinking Through the China Prob-
lem," ibid., p. 325. 
20 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
United States has had such resolve and courage to sacrifice 
for others. 60 
The lesson of Vietnam has been quite painful for the United 
States. If the U.S. has no intention of becoming involved in another 
civil war in Asia, it was reasoned that the U.S. would be better off 
terminate the defense commitment with Taiwan. Besides decreasing 
Washington's cost of ending the defense treaty, Peking also tried to 
stress the benefits of an early normalization of relations between the 
U.S. and the PRC. The PRC leaders had linked Peking-Washington 
economic relations with the normalization issue. The PRC treated the 
U.S. as a residual supplier of agricultural products since the opening of 
trade in the early 1970s. Unless U.S. products had been clearly supe-
rior (as, for example, Boeing passenger aircraft and ammonia plants). 
Peking would rather buy from other countries than American suppli-
ers, presumably in an effort to increase pressure on the U.S. to normal-
ize relations with the PRC. 61 
In September 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing also hinted that Peking's 
patience regarding normalization should not be taken for granted and 
would not last forever. 62 The PRC kept warning the U.S. of the dan-
ger of further delay of the normalization decision and of foregoing 
potential political and economic benefits from an early decision to ac-
cept Peking's terms for normalization. Secretary of State Vance stated 
in January 1979 that "failure to try to move forward would have left 
us in danger of moving backward at great cost to our global posi-
tion."63 The Carter Administration apparently accepted Peking's 
warnings as real and meaningful. 
(5) Challenging Washington's Legal Position 
Teng's public disclosure of President Ford's position on the nor-
malization issue was aimed at limiting President Carter's room for rna-
60. According to Taiwan's sources, the speech was ordered by the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Community Party as one of the means to prepare its middle level cadres for 
the 11th Party Congress, which was held between August 11 to 18, 1977, quoted from 
Chiu, ed., Normalizing Relations with the PRC, supra note 39, p. 188. 
61. Quoted from prepared statement of Dwight H. Perkins in U.S., Congress, House, 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Nor-
malization of Relations with the PRC: Practical Implications, hearings, 95th Congress, 1st 
Session, September 20, 21, 28, 29; October 11 and 13, 1977, p. 289. 
62. Louis Boccardi, "Deng: Vance Trip Was Setback in U.S.-China Ties," Washington 
Post, 7 September 1977. 
63. U.S., Department of State, U.S. Policy toward China July 15, 1971-January 15, 
1979, p. 56. 
PEKING'S NEGOTIATION STYLE 21 
neuver. Peking also challenged Washington's bargaining position on 
the Taiwan issue by stressing the U.S. position in the Shanghai Com-
munique. In the Shanghai Communique, the U.S. had acknowledged 
the one-China prinicple. From Peking's perspective, the U.S. had no 
legal right subsequently to set up a liaison office in Taiwan after nor-
malization. Nor did the U.S. have a right to ask the PRC not to use 
force to settle the Taiwan issue. 
(6) Playing the Bureaucratic Politics Game 
Richard Solomon points out that Peking has often exploited in-
ter-American rivalries, favoring individuals regarded as sympathetic 
to its aims. For example, Peking played Henry Kissinger off against 
Secretary of State Rogers, later Zbigniew Brzezinski off against Cyrus 
Vance, and Alexander Haig off against national security adviser Rich-
ard Allen. Peking turned to the U.S. official whose world views more 
closely corresponded to its own. During the Carter Administration, 
Brzezinski was the ideal interlocutor, identified by the PRC leaders. 
Brzezinski believed that Soviet-American relations were deeply adver-
sary. Detente with the Soviet Union created only a false sense of se-
curity for the American people. Brzezinski favored taking a tougher 
stand toward Soviet aggression in the world. Brzezinski's May 1978 
trip to Peking and his advocacy of a tougher line toward the Soviet 
Union had generated and increased his clash with Vance. Brzezinski 
was anxious to speed up the normalization process in order to gain 
leverage against the Soviet Union. He was the key figure in negotiat-
ing the normalization agreement during the last stage of negotiation in 
December 11-15, 1978 in Washington. Vance at that time was in the 
Middle East to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. 
Brzezinski was the person who had dominant influence in the timing 
of the normalization announcement. Brzezinski turned out to be the 
winner of the bureaucratic politics game on the normalization issue. 
Two days after the normalization announcement,· President 
Carter told Brzezinski that "you are genuinely the driving force be-
hind the whole effort. Whenever I wavered, you pushed me and 
pressed me to go through with this."64 In 1981, during Brzezinski's 
visit to Peking, Teng Hsiao-p'ing also told him that "you and I to-
gether overcame the last difficulties" of normalization.65 Once again 
Peking had apparently selected the right interlocutor and successfully 
played upon the institutional rivalry between the National Security 
64. Brzezinski, Power and Prinicple, supra note 38, p. 233. 
65. Ibid., p. 230. 
22 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Council and the State Department to prod American China policy 
forward. 
CONCLUSION 
In brief, Peking used various channels and tactics to communi-
cate with Washington its stakes and firmness on the Taiwan question. 
Peking also exploited every possible means to influence decision-mak-
ers in Washington. In 1978, the Carter Administration finally con-
cluded that Peking meant what it said on the non-negotiable Taiwan 
issue. That is, Peking would not make any concession on the Taiwan 
question. It was not possible to get a pledge from Peking not to use 
force against Taiwan, so there was no point in asking Peking to do it. 
Washington's acceptance of Peking's terms for normalization can be 
viewed as Peking's triumph in effectively and persuasively conveying 
its demands, warnings, and rewards to the United States. 
It is also important to note U.S. decision-makers' perceptions of 
the PRC. President Carter was told by Kissinger that the PRC lead-
ers could be trusted; "they will carry out meticulously both the letter 
and spirit of an agreement."66 "The Chinese always acted as though 
they still considered themselves members of the Middle Kingdom-at 
the center of the civilized world-prepared simply to wait until others 
accepted their position on 'matter of principle,' " Carter writes.67 
Once again, Peking's patience apparently paid off. 
66. Carter, Keeping Faith, supra note 15, p. 188. 
67. Ibid., p. 189. 
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